|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| No. | Title | Author | ||
| 1. | General Introduction | Hamilton | ||
| 2. | Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence | Jay | ||
| 3. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence |
Jay | ||
| 4. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence |
Jay | ||
| 5. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence |
Jay | ||
| 6. | Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States | Hamilton | ||
| 7. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States |
Hamilton | ||
| 8. | The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States | Hamilton | ||
| 9. | The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection | Hamilton | ||
| 10. | The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection |
Madison | ||
| 11. | The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy | Hamilton | ||
| 12. | The Utility of the Union in Respect to Revenue | Hamilton | ||
| 13. | Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government | Hamilton | ||
| 14. | Objections to the Proposed Constitution from Extent of Territory Answered | Madison | ||
| 15. | The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union | Hamilton | ||
| 16. | The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union |
Hamilton | ||
| 17. | The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union |
Hamilton | ||
| 18. | The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union |
Hamilton and Madison | ||
| 19. | The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union |
Hamilton and Madison | ||
| 20. | The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union |
Hamilton and Madison | ||
| 21. | Other Defects of the Present Confederation | Hamilton | ||
| 22. | The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation |
Hamilton | ||
| 23. | The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union | Hamilton | ||
| 24. | The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered | Hamilton | ||
| 25. | The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered |
Hamilton | ||
| 26. | The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered | Hamilton | ||
| 27. | The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered |
Hamilton | ||
| 28. | The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered |
Hamilton | ||
| 29. | Concerning the Militia | Hamilton | ||
| 30. | Concerning the General Power of Taxation | Hamilton | ||
| 31. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation |
Hamilton | ||
| 32. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation |
Hamilton | ||
| 33. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation |
Hamilton | ||
| 34. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation |
Hamilton | ||
| 35. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation |
Hamilton | ||
| 36. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation |
Hamilton | ||
| 37. | Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government | Madison | ||
| 38. | The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed | Madison | ||
| 39. | The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles | Madison | ||
| 40. | The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained | Madison | ||
| 41. | General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution | Madison | ||
| 42. | The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered | Madison | ||
| 43. | The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered |
Madison | ||
| 44. | Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States | Madison | ||
| 45. | The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered | Madison | ||
| 46. | The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared | Madison | ||
| 47. | The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts | Madison | ||
| 48. | These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other | Madison | ||
| 49. | Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention | Hamilton or Madison | ||
| 50. | Periodic Appeals to the People Considered | Hamilton or Madison | ||
| 51. | The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments | Hamilton or Madison | ||
| 52. | The House of Representatives | Hamilton or Madison | ||
| 53. | The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives |
Hamilton or Madison | ||
| 54. | The Apportionment of Members Among the States | Hamilton or Madison | ||
| 55. | The Total Number of the House of Representatives | Hamilton or Madison | ||
| 56. | The Same Subject Continued: The Total Number of the House of Representatives |
Hamilton or Madison | ||
| 57. | The Alleged Tendency of the Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation | Hamilton or Madison | ||
| 58. | Objection that the Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered | Madison | ||
| 59. | Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members | Hamilton | ||
| 60. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members |
Hamilton | ||
| 61. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members |
Hamilton | ||
| 62. | The Senate | Hamilton or Madison | ||
| 63. | The Senate Continued | Hamilton or Madison | ||
| 64. | The Powers of the Senate | Jay | ||
| 65. | The Powers of the Senate Continued | Hamilton | ||
| 66. | Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered | Hamilton | ||
| 67. | The Executive Department | Hamilton | ||
| 68. | The Mode of Electing the President | Hamilton | ||
| 69. | The Real Character of the Executive | Hamilton | ||
| 70. | The Executive Department Further Considered | Hamilton | ||
| 71. | The Duration in Office of the Executive | Hamilton | ||
| 72. | The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered | Hamilton | ||
| 73. | The Provision for Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power | Hamilton | ||
| 74. | The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive | Hamilton | ||
| 75. | The Treaty Making Power of the Executive | Hamilton | ||
| 76. | The Appointing Power of the Executive | Hamilton | ||
| 77. | The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered | Hamilton | ||
| 78. | The Judiciary Department | Hamilton | ||
| 79. | The Judiciary Continued | Hamilton | ||
| 80. | The Powers of the Judiciary | Hamilton | ||
| 81. | The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of Judicial Authority | Hamilton | ||
| 82. | The Judiciary Continued | Hamilton | ||
| 83. | The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury | Hamilton | ||
| 84. | Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered | Hamilton | ||
| 85. | Concluding Remarks | Hamilton | ||